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Source: Extracted from the annual reports of Yaohan and Jusco (1993/94) , (1994/95) , (1995/96) , (l 996/97).On the other hand, Jusco still performs exceptionally well even under the condition of Hong Kong's sluggish retail sector. Its sales and profits are increasing steadily (Table 2) . In February 1998, Jusco Japan announced to offer help to Yaohan Japan's operations. In April 1998, Jusco Hong Kong had taken up one of the largest Yaohan' s store outlet -Hunghom in Hong Kong -for further expansion after opening a new store oqtlet in Hong Kong in March, 1998 (personal communication) . Jusco is one of the unusual Japanese companies continuing to expand while a majority of Japanese department stores are either stagnant, shrinking or closing their operations in Hong Kong (see Table 1 ).
Many explanations have been put fOf\vard to explain why Yaohan became bankrupt.
Some practitioners suggested that it is because Yaohan expanded too quickly after moving its headquarters to Hong Kong by opening seven stores between the period of 1991 to 1995. This led to the adoption of an over-borrowing policy to finance store expansion projects which had cost Yaohan too much to repay. Others attributed Yaohan's decline to its lack ofpositioning in the retail market. However, it appears that these explanations are only parts of the causes for Yaohan' s decline.
For a fuller explanations of success or failure among Japanese companies overseas, the authors turned to the existing literature on Japanese management overseas and found that a majority of existing studies on Japanese management of host-country nationals (HCNs) show that Japanese multinational corporations tend to employ ethnocentric practice l to manage human resources oftheir overseas subsidiaries (Trevor and White, 1983; Sethi, et al., 1984; Kidahashi, 1987; Abo, 1989; Fucini and Fucini; 1990) . Furthermore, many studies on Japanese management of parent-country nationals (PCNs) found that Japanese expatriates tend to be less acculturated to the host culture and more committed to the parent company, compared with expatriates of Westem MNCs Oddou, 1985 and 1986; Nicholson, 1984; Gregersen and Black, 1990) . Recurrent to these studies is the perceived need for Japanese multinational corporations to develop less ethnocentric staffing approach by promoting more local managers to senior managerial positions, and to get Japanese expatriates more acculturated to the host culture. However, little empirical research examines whether the ethnocentric staffing approach would directly lead to the diminished multinational corporations'
performance. In addition, almost all these studies cannot explain the critical factors leading to the company's corporate performance. In order to examine the critical factors attributing to Yaohan's bankruptcy and Jusco's increasing profitability, a more holistic approach studying intemational human resource management (IHRM) aspects of the company is adopted; and the contextual, strategic and technological factors related to the company are examined. In this W呵， the pu中oses of the present study of tracing the differences in performance of Yaohan and Jusco in Hong Kong, and the factors leading to the adoption of the IHRM practices can be achieved.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Key positions in multinational corporations employing ethnocentric management practice are filled by PCNs. This practice is common in the early stage of intemationalisation, when a company is establishing a new business in another country which does not have I The ethnocentric management practice refers to a preference for putting PCNs in key positions everywhere in the world and reward them more handsomely for work than the HCNs, along with a tendency to feel that PCNs are more intelligent, capable or reliable than the HCNs. The board and top management in the headquarters and overseas subsidiaries are from the home country and have been indoctrinated with home-country experience.
appropriate skills and knowledge (Dowling et al., 1994; Hend旬， 1994) . Furthennore, multinational c。中orations employ ethnocentric management practice when they perceive there is a lack of qualified HCNs, and the need to maintain good communication links with corporate headquarters. Since ethnocentric management practice has a number of disadvantages such as limiting promotion opportunities for HCNs leading to reduced productivity and increased tumover, higher chance for PCNs to make mistakes and poor decisions during their adjustment to the host culture, and higher costs attached to PCN s compensation, multinational corporations tend to use less ethnocentric management practice the longer they have operated in the host-country (Zeira, 1976; Hutton, 1988; Adler and Ghad仗， 1990 In a MN C using high level of technology, it places greater emphasis on the human resources who need to have greater technical competence and specialised knowledge (Yuen and k凹， 1993/4: 367) . Precision and quality are often important consideration since human errors can be costly, companies employing technology need to have proper recruitment and selection procedures and need to invest in training and development of employees, in order to build up the morale and satisfaction, and to foster employee commitment (Sparrow and Pettigrew, 1988) .
Thus, hypothesis 3 is: The more retail technology the company applies, the more equal IHRM practices the company will use.
People feel more comfortable with others of similar background (Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979) 
METHODOLOGY
The research employed a qualitative case study method to study IHRM practices of Yaohan and Jusco in Hong Kong. These two department stores were chosen 企om a total of eleven Japanese department stores (see Table 1 ) because they operated the same type ofbusiness in general merchandising chain stores, but showed different perform組ces ( Table 2 ). The research was conducted by in-depth interviews which were guided by a semi-structured openended interview schedule. A total of 10 Japanese expatriates and 40 local employees were interviewed (Table 3 ). Primary data 企om interviews was supplemented by secondary data 企om company documents and reports, government publications, and newspaper clippings. Another case company, Jusco is also a wholly-owned Japanese department store established in 1986. It opened its first store outlet in 1987, and operated six store outlets in the new towns of Hong Kong and employed 1,500 local employees in early 1998. The parent company remained in Tokyo, Japan.
The IHRM practices employed by Yaohan and Jusco are examined on the basis of three functions -recruitment and selection, compensation, training and development.
Recruitment and Selection
IHRM study includes a number of staffing issues such as executive nationality staffmg policies, expatriate failure, and recruitment and selection ofHCNs (Dowling et al. , 1994) which are examined in this study. In tenns of executive nationality staffi峙， Yaohan was more ethnocentric than Jusco because it sta在 all key executives and more than 30 percent of middle managerial positions by Japanese expatriates. According to the local personnel manager of Another issue to be examined is expatriate failure which is defined as a diminished perfonnance as a result of an inability of the expatriates to handle new responsibilities e丘ectively， and to adjust to the country of assignment (Dowling et al., 1994) . Both companies assigned Japanese expatriates to Hong Kong for a rather long period (an average of 5 ye訂s). Yaohan was perceived by local employees as having more problems in expatriate failure than Jusco.
Compared with the less than 10 percent among Jusco' s local interviewees, Yaohan had more than 90 percent of its local interviewees said that their Japanese managers were insensitive to the local culture and envirorunent, lacked language skills, and were not able to adjust to local environment.
As far as HCNs' recruitment and selection is concemed, the major feature wru弓 that almost all HCNs of both companies were recruited to be excluded 企om the company's intemallabour market which was exclusively monopolised by the Japanese expatriates. However, in Jusco a limited number of local professionals, such as computer specialists and accountants implementing retail technologies, were recruited into a relatively better employment condition than other local employees. This is explained in their compensation and training and development below.
Compensation
The most common challenge for expatriate compensation is managing their expenses.
Many companies estimate that an expatriate employee costs three to five times as much as a local employee (Dowling et al., 1994) . Since Yaohan had a 1訂ge number of Japanese expatriates, the cost for expatriate compensation was high. Furthennore, 80 percent ofthe monthly compensation for Yaohan's PCNs were paid on the basis oftheir seniority. Since some PCNs had been working
for Yaohan for at least 20 ye紅s ， they cost a big bill in expatriate compensation. The remaining 20 percent ofPCNs' monthly pay included 伽nily and adjustment allowances, other allowances such as rent, parking expenses, and children's education abroad. They were also paid two yearly bonuses in yen. These al10wances and bonuses also took up a large part of the company's expenditure.
On the other hand, Jusco used a so called "service contract" to pay PCNs on the basis of individual's and company's perfonnance. For example, the Managing Director of Jusco was paid by a fixed amount of monthly salary and housing allowance of HK$130,000 in his 1994-95 contract. The " service contract" served to motivate Japanese executives to work for a higher perfonnance since their next contract depended on how they could fulfil the perfonnance target.
This contract has also reduced local employees' perception of pay inequity between Japanese expatriates and local employees.
Both Yaohan and Jusco paid local employees on the basis of qualifications and experience subjected to the current market rate. All local employees received an annual bonus based on individual's and company's performance. They were not entitled to any allowances like the Japanese. However, Jusco' s local professionals were paid with higher salary and bonus of at least 20 percent above the average of other HCNs.
Training and Development
The IHRM perspective of training and development includes the pre-departure training, and training and development provided to both PCNs and HCNs (Dowling, 1994) . The expatriates of Yaohan and Jusco received a lifelong generalist training and development through extensive job rotation, and continuous on-the-job and off-the-job training throughout their career.
Although both companies conducted some pre-departure training such as introduction of the host country culture and language courses, Yaohan had a high expatriate failure rate th組 Jusco. It is because compared with Yaoh泊， Jusco' s expatriates had more overseas experience before coming to Hong Kong. The three Japanese expatriates of Jusco had at least nine ye位s of overseas experience. F or example, the Managing Director of Jusco had worked in Hong Kong for five years, and in Malaysia for six years before he was assigned back to Hong Kong. However, since
Yaohan over-expanded, it had exhausted more qualified and experienced Japanese candidates for overseas assignment and had to assign younger and less experienced staff \vho were in supervisory grade in J apan to tal也 up managerial tasks in Hong Kong. Furthermore, many of these young expatriates were told to come to Hong Kong with very short notice. Therefore, they were totally unprepared for the assignment not to mention the chance for pre-departure training.
Compared with Yaoh徊， Jusco provided more comprehensive training and development to their HCNs. Jusco introduced generalist training 一"Jusco University" -to HCNs in 1992. All local managers from supervisory grade up were provided with a three level training courses.
Furthermore, local professionals were given special training in Japan. The objective for the training was to facilitate local managers to tal也 up more senior managerial positions under Jusco's localisation policy. On the other hand, Yaohan did not provide training to HCNs for localisation. Even though it conducted graduate training programmes, the local graduate trainees had little opportunities to be promoted to senior managerial positions. Furthennore, although spiritual training -a kind of generalist training -was provided to local employees, since the pu中ose of such training was to spread the chainnan's religion, many HCNs were sceptical of its usefulness for developing HCNs to tal也 up senior managerial posts (Wong, 1996) .
Summary: IHRM Policies Practised by Yaohan and Jusco
From the empirical results, Yaohan practised a more ethnocentric management practice compared to Jusco. Yaohan had a much higher Japanese expatriate-local employee ratio, more Japanese expatriates occupying senior managerial positions, and higher expatriate failure rate.
Furthennore, Yaohan had a less equitable compensation between Japanese expatriates and local employees. Furthennore, unlike Jusco, Yaohan did not consider any local managers to succeed se凶or management and executive positions in the company. In the fo l1owing section, the factors leading to the use of different IHRM approach by Yaohan and Jusco are examined.
FACTORS AFFECTING IHRM POLICIES AND PRACTICES
The development of IHRM practices can be traced to external factors which can either be controlled or cannot be controlled by the company. Companies can adjust the factors -such as business and employment strategies -which they can control. However, companies are subject to many factors -such as the company's history, background, and competitive environment- The extemal environment of the p訂ent country -Japan -had been going through the longest recession since World War 11. Although the parent company of Yaohan was located in Hong Kong 2 during the fieldwork, the source of Japanese expatriates still came 企om Japan.
These Japanese expatriates had to face a tough extemal environment of Japan wruch was the base for their long-term career development. As they might be sent back to Japan after their Hong Kong assignment, many Japanese expatriate interviewees ofYaohan said that they had to be more conservative and risk-averse since they thought the penalty for a mistake in their overseas assignment could become harsher as their career opportunities in Japan became limited in the post-bubble recession. A Japanese manager said,"Rather than becoming a madogawazoku (a position with a seat by the window but with no real responsibility), we may be given ka似的taki (tap on the shoulder signalling being asked to resign on their own initiative)." Therefore, many
Japanese expatriates of Yaohan said that they had to stick to the Japanese work practices in handling HR and other business issues. This explains why Yaohan used a more ethnocentric IHRM policy.
Conversely, the parent company of Jusco had become a leading retailer in Japan during the post-bubble recession since 1992. It ranked second in Japan in 1997 (Nikkei Ryutsu News, 1998). This induced the parent company to decentralise more power to overseas operatio郎， and the PCNs and HCNs had more autonomy to decide its own business strategy. A local manager of Jusco said,"The more open-minded Japanese expatriates could carry out more innovative IHRM practices because of the 'hand-off policy adopted by the p訂ent company in Japan. This explains we have more autonomy to implement retail technology, and provide better compensation package to the local managers who can operate the technology." This background of the parent company attributes Jusco to adopt a more equitable IHRM system between PCNs and HCNs than that of Yaohan.
Tuming to the extemal environment of the host country -Hong Kong, the general state of Hong Kong's economy which is normally ref1ected in the property rental rate, and interest 2 The parent company ofYaohan moved to Hong Kong since 1989, but it moved to Shanghai in July 1996. rate is examined. These indicators of Hong Kong economy had become more f1uctuated and unpredictable since 1990s. Due to the rapid store expansion policy in the early 1990s, Yaohan resorted to over-borrowing bank loans to finance its expansion. The interest paid for the bank loans accounted for a high proportion of its overall operating costs. However, during the period of 1994 and 1995, the interest rate was increased sharply as a result of a world-wide economic slowdown, which pushed up Yaohan's interest payments. Furtherrnore, the world-wide economic slowdown also caused a sluggish growth in the local consumer markee, and this affected its business in terms of declining sales turnover. This explains why Yaohan's sales tumover decreased from HK$3.93 to HK$3.64 billion from 1994 to 1996 (as shown in Table 2 ).
This problem of declining business was aggravated by the over-borrowing policy of Yaohan.
Its diminishing profits were further offset by the higher costs of paying interest on its bank loan (South China Morning Post, 1996) . This resulted in a drop of its operating profit from HK$54
to an operating loss of HK$168 million from 1994 to 1996 (Table 2) . It in tum affected
Yaohan' s projected growth in sales volume which directly dete訂ed Yaohan from using retail technology, and providing a more equitable compensation and training and development to the local employees. This explain why Yaohan's operational and human resource management got deteriorated gradually.
On the other hand, Jusco handled the f1uctuating host country economy by resorting to employing more part-time staff. It helped Jusco to reduce costs and maintained its more equitable IHRM policy and the further development and implementation of retail technology which in turn strengthened the company's competitiveness and corporate perforrnance.
Business Strategy
Corporate business strategy influences the staffing activity both at home and overseas.
Yaohan pursued a rapid expansioi1 strategy. Coupled with the ethnocentric approach, the expansion strategy exhausted the number of qualified Japanese managers for overseas assigrunent. As a result, more than 30 percent of PCNs had less than five-year working experience. When they were assigned to take up managerial positions, they had little experience in making decisions in strategic matters such as merchandising, and financial matters such as profit disposal, borrowings and investments. Furthermore, these less experienced PCNs not only were insensitive to local culture, but were also less competent and had less technical skills and knowledge. This had directly led to the higher expatriate failure rate in Yaohan than Jusco. Due to the lower PCN s' quality, Yaohan had committed many mistakes in merchandising and sta伍ng which led to its decline.
On the other hand, since there were only a limited number of Japanese expatriates in Jusco and most of whom were not replaced by another expa甘iates after they had been repatriated back to
Japan. In addition, Jusco's expatriates with high performance and few problems in cross-cultural management were retained to stay in Hong Kong for a longer term. F or example, the former managing director had stayed in Hong Kong for 11 years. The use of different strategies in business and staffing by the two companies explains why they had different IHRM practices and corporate performance results.
Use of Retail Technology
The use of technology is another important c。中orate strategy determining IHRM approach used by multinational corporations. Jusco had been working hard to implement retail technology, such as electronic point of sales (EPOS) and electronic data processing, ever since it started to operate in Hong Kong. On the 20th anniversary of its parent company in 1989, Jusco set up three establishments -head office, buying office and delivery centre -to facilitate the implementation of the company-wide EPOS system (Anonymous, 1990) . In 1994, the EPOS system was installed and implemented (Annual Report, 1995/96) . From the management' s point of view, acquisition of new skills from the local professional staff who have the knowledge in the EPOS system and expertise in analysing data generated from the system became the underlying imperative because the company's skill requirements had become more professional-based as a result of the introduction of the retail teclmology (Sparrow and Pettigrew, 1988; Sparrow, 1988a Sparrow, , 1988b Sparrow, and 1988c .
However, the supply of professional staff with qualifications was insufficient in the labour market as a result of the problem of the brain drain in Hong Kong during the 1980s.
J usco experienced a " skill gap" in the professional positions, and had to adjust its employment strategies to overcome this gap. Furthermore, the management was afraid that the company' s ownership-specific advantages, derived from the EPOS technology, would dissipate to its competitors through the turnover of its professional sta丘 This explains why Jusco employed a positive skill supply strategy by offering local professional staff better employment conditions in pay and training opportunities and specialised job assignments, compared with other local staff with low skills (Sparrow and Pettigrew, 1988 ). This could attract and limit attrition of local professional staff, and made them more committed to the company. As a result, Jusco tended . to employ more local professional staff as it applied retail technology. These local professionals received more opportunity for training, and a better bonus and pay as an incentive.
All five local professional interviewees said that they felt they had been treated as important staff members and they could utilise their skills fully at work.
IMPLICATIONS
The central issue for intemational management is not to identify the best IHRM policy per 仗， but rather to find the best fit between the company's intemational environment, its overall strategy, its HRM policy and implementation, and keep all these dimensions in direct alignment (Adler and Ghador, 1990; Scullion, 1995) . The "art" of managing HR requires interpretation in the perspective of the local host country environment (Dowling et al., 1994) . The IHRM practices adopted by Yaohan show that its parent company was unwilling to decrease the level of perfonnance control over Hong Kong operation as Yaohan still heavily relied on Japanese expatriates to perfonn control and coordination in Hong Kong, even though it had moved its headquarters to Hong Kong.
Yaohan' s ethnocentric staffing approach was not a result of the shortage of local middle managers, but a c。中 orate strategy of the company which relied on PCNs in managing overseas operations rather than on retail technology. Furthermore, Yaohan merely employed local employees and managers to perform tasks with little decision-making power which was monopolised by the Japanese who performed control functions. Local employees had little organisational recognition from the company of their need for career planning, training and development. Furthennore, they were dissatisfied that Japanese expatriate managers who were compensated with much better compensation package with many exclusive allowances. As a result, local employees could not have much job satisfaction and had high labour tumover rate.
Since Yaohan depended much on the Japanese expatriates for control and operations, it had to select competent ones for such tasks. Conversely, Yaohan fell victim to its over-expansion and ethnocentric staffing policies as the quality of its expatriate managers decreased. This IHRM practice adopted by Yaohan can be considered as not able to align with its environment and business strategy which explains why the company declined.
On the other hand, Jusco had adopted an IHRM practice which aligned with its environment and strategy. First1y, the special remuneration package 一" service contract" -not only had motivated Japanese to achieve higher profitability in Hong Kong, but also made HCNs felt that the company was fair which made them more committed to the company. Secondly, Jusco' s positive use of local professional sta在 and the more equitable compensation and training practices provided to the local employees were also an effort exerted by the management of Jusco to cope with the market pressures. This partly explains why Jusco managed to make continuous profits under the present retail slump.
Thirdly, the decrease in staffing Japanese expatriates in the Hong Kong operation and the localisation policy by promoting more local managers in se凶or managerial positions had made Jusco more able make better corporate decisions, such as merchandising and buying decisions.
Furthennore, local managers and employees became less mobile and more committed to work for Jusco. Fourthly, the "hands-off policy from the p訂ent company had made Jusco more able to adjust to and align with the increasingly fluctuating local economic environment of Hong Kong.
In brief, the IRHM practices adopted by Yaohan show that it employed a more ethnocentric management approach than Jusco. Since Yaohan and Jusco faced a similar extemal environment of Hong Kong in terms of the cost and quality of labour force and the increasingly fluctuating and complicated economic situations, both comp缸lÏes employed different IHRM practices and perfonned different1y. Nevertheless, the following conclusion seems to be reasonable on a tentative basis as it may help to shed light on the problems of IHRM in other Japanese retail companies in Hong Kong. The ethnocentric approach to IHRM used by Yaohan can be regarded as an inappropriate s仕ategy adopted by the top management which had directly caused its decline. On the other hand, IHRM practices adopted by Jusco is considered to match well with its extemal and intemal environment which explains its outstanding performance in Hong Kong retail industry.
The study is a preliminary attempt to use a seldom used approach -IHRM practice -to explain the perfonnance of the two Japanese department stores which have been discussed in popu加 press and the industry. It aims to provide insight and relevant infonnation to both academics and practitioners. However, the results should not be regarded as conclusive regarding the relationship between the IHRM practices employed by the company and its performance.
Further research based on a larger scale quantitative method should be adopted to explore the direct relationship between IHRM practices and c。中orate perfonnance of companies. 
